A company can add bitcoin to its balance sheet. The harder question is what it can do when investors stop paying a premium for that decision. Recent changes in bitcoin treasury valuations have brought financing, operating income and risk controls into sharper focus.
An analysis of 50 publicly listed bitcoin treasury companies by the Financial Times found that their combined market value fell from about $150 billion in July 2025 to $67 billion in August 2026. Shares in 43 of the 50 were below their pre-pivot levels, with 35 down by at least half. The figures describe a defined group of companies that recently made bitcoin a central strategy; they do not measure the performance of every listed bitcoin holder.
For companies that raised equity to buy more bitcoin, a lower share price can change the calculation. If shares trade below the value investors assign to the assets they represent, issuing new shares to buy coins may dilute existing holders rather than increase their bitcoin exposure per share. The result depends on the company’s liabilities, other assets and the definition of net asset value used.
“The shakeout revealed that the business model was the premium, not the bitcoin,” said Wojciech Kaszycki, a strategic adviser to BTCS S.A. and, according to the company, a representative of its leading shareholder. BTCS is a Poland-listed digital asset company whose shares also trade on Frankfurt’s Open Market.
Why the balance sheet matters
Strategy provides a prominent example of the shift in approach. After selling bitcoin at lower prices and later buying again at higher prices, chief executive Phong Le said the decisions reflected the company’s capital needs rather than an attempt to trade the bitcoin price. The sequence shows why a treasury company’s funding obligations can matter as much as its view of the asset.
ProCap Financial made a different capital-allocation choice: it reported selling 52 bitcoin to fund the repurchase of about two million shares at a discount to its stated net asset value. A buyback at a sufficiently large discount can increase bitcoin exposure per remaining share, but it also reduces the assets and cash available to the company. It is a response to a valuation gap, not a recurring source of income.
Kaszycki argues that companies holding only bitcoin have a weaker case for a lasting premium than those that can also demonstrate an operating business. “A price recovery fixes the P&L and the headlines. It doesn’t fix the fact that a company which only holds bitcoin is an ETF with overhead, a discount, and a management team,” he said. This is his assessment, not a settled conclusion about how investors will value every treasury company.
The search for income
BTCS is pursuing one route through blockchain infrastructure and bitcoin-based liquidity arrangements. In a March 2026 market disclosure, the company described a six-month Hemi program involving 50 to 100 BTC, with a stated minimum annualised return of 10% for the first two months and 6% for the following four. The disclosed terms describe the proposed arrangement; any realised return should be assessed against a subsequent company report.
Other approaches have different trade-offs. In its first-half 2026 financial results, Metaplanet reported revenue of ¥4.944 billion alongside a net loss of ¥182.774 billion, largely reflecting the revaluation of its bitcoin holdings. Income from options can support revenue during periods when coin prices are flat, but selling options may limit participation in a sharp rally.
Strive, meanwhile, has used a preferred security with frequent cash dividends to attract funding. Such instruments provide capital but create obligations that must be met in cash. Bitcoin-denominated income could help if converted when needed, yet it is neither the only possible funding source nor a guarantee that dividends will remain affordable.
Liquidity programs can expose a company to counterparties, custody arrangements, smart contracts and restrictions on withdrawing assets. A stated minimum yield does not eliminate those risks, and returns quoted on an annualised basis should not be confused with returns actually earned over a shorter period.
What investors can assess
The distinction is less about whether a company can call its bitcoin “productive” and more about evidence. Investors can compare bitcoin per share over time, cash needs, borrowing and preferred-dividend commitments, realised operating income, fees, counterparty exposure and the portion of coins committed to strategies that cannot be exited quickly.
Kaszycki’s central argument is that the next phase of the market will test what treasury companies do between bitcoin purchases. It is a useful question. The answer will depend on independently verifiable results, the risks taken to earn them and whether those results are durable when the market turns.
Disclosure: Wojciech Kaszycki is a strategic adviser to BTCS S.A. This article provides general market analysis and is not investment advice.
