Published by Global Banking & Finance Review®
Posted on March 6, 2026
6 min readLast updated: March 6, 2026
Despite years of investment, many Iran-backed militias in Iraq are hesitating to mobilize in the U.S.–Iran–Israel conflict, due to diminished capabilities, political integration, and self-interest.
By John Davison
BAGHDAD, March 6 (Reuters) - Iran has spent decades and billions of dollars preparing foreign proxy fighters like A.J., a commander in a pro-Iranian paramilitary group in Iraq, for a moment just like this. Since the U.S. and Israel went to war on the Islamic Republic a week ago, A.J. has been awaiting marching orders from Tehran.
But they have yet to come. And so as the leadership in Tehran faces a potentially existential threat, many of the fighters and militia groups the Iranians cultivated in Iraq have so far not entered the fight for them. There has been no mass mobilization of Iran's proxies inside Iraq, one of the last redoubts of the Islamic Republic's once-formidable system of alliances stretching from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iraq.
Some pro-Iranian groups in Iraq have claimed attacks in recent days, to be sure. One group said it had fired drones at "enemy bases in Iraq and the region," and several explosions rocked the northern city of Erbil, a Kurdish stronghold that hosts a U.S. base. But most missile and drone attacks have come directly from Iran, Kurdish officials say. The more than two-dozen attacks claimed online in the name of the Islamic Resistance of Iraq – a label used by various militants – have caused no significant damage, and in some cases there is no evidence of the attacks.
Even if direct orders do come from Tehran, A.J. believes that they'll only be issued to two or three of the dozens of Iraqi Shi'ite Muslim paramilitaries nurtured by Iran. "I just don't think most of them are reliable anymore," he told Reuters. "Some will act. Others would have front groups that could launch attacks with deniability. But many are just looking out for their own interests these days."
The trajectory of A.J.'s personal journey as a member of an Iranian-backed force in Iraq tracks the rise and fall of Iran's strategy of spreading proxy militias through the region, under the leadership of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and its expeditionary Quds Force, to fight America and Israel. His is the story of how the Israelis and Americans wore down and diminished most of these proxies, leaving the Islamic Republic facing its most perilous moment largely alone.
A.J., who is from Shi'ite-majority southern Iraq, spoke on condition he not be identified, for fear of being targeted by Israeli or U.S. strikes. Reuters is using the initials of one of his nicknames for clarity.
A.J. blamed several factors for the reduced military potency of Iran's Iraqi proxies: Israel and America's war of attrition against other regional allies, the loss of Syria as a supply line, and the transition of key commanders into Iraqi political and economic life.
His assessment is shared by more than two dozen people interviewed by Reuters, including militia members, Iraqi and Western officials, Shi'ite clerics, and close watchers of Iran's once-vaunted "Axis of Resistance." They painted a picture of a proxy network hollowed out by years of targeted assassinations of hard-to-replace leaders; the loss of secure bases for training and weapons transit; and the transformation of Iraqi commanders into wealthy politicians and businessmen with more to lose than gain from confronting the West.
The Iraqi militia leaders "don't want sanctions on them as individuals, they want to have access to Western healthcare, to have their children educated abroad," said Gareth Stansfield, a professor of Middle East politics at Exeter University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, who has advised the British and regional governments. "That's accelerated since the 12-day war" between Israel and Iran last June, he said.
Iraqi security officials and paramilitary insiders say Iran's proxies could yet enter the fray in force if the war drags on, if there's a U.S.-Israeli attack they perceive as being against Shi'ites as a whole, or if U.S.-backed Kurdish groups attack Iran.
Even if they wanted to fight, though, these Iran-backed groups lack the means they once had. They have used outmoded weaponry in their handful of attacks since the war began, according to Iraqi security officials. Tehran has sent no new weapons to his group since the battle with Israel last year, A.J. said. Reuters couldn't determine if this was the case for other pro-Iran militias in Iraq.
During last year's confrontation with Israel, Iran's Revolutionary Guards instructed A.J.'s group to retaliate, which they did, firing drones toward Israel. But moving weapons now would be "too risky, they could be spotted by reconnaissance," A.J. said.
Israel's military told Reuters that "terrorist factions in Iraq operate as a proxy of Iran."
"Operations against the Iranian-led resistance axis, combined with a clear understanding that Israel would not stand idly by as its civilians were attacked, have led to a decrease in attacks from Iraqi territory toward Israel," it said in a statement.
The Iraqi and Iranian governments didn't respond to Reuters questions for this story. The White House and the Pentagon also didn't respond to requests for comment.
On day two of the war, A.J. and his comrades mourned Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed by an airstrike during the Israeli-U.S. assault on Tehran.
Still, no orders came to attack.
In Baghdad, thousands of Iraqi supporters of the ayatollah, including off-duty fighters from Iran-backed paramilitary groups, nevertheless rushed the gates of the fortified Green Zone, chanting "death to America" and hoping to attack the U.S. embassy.
They never managed to reach the bridge leading into the Green Zone, and were beaten back and tear-gassed by Iraqi riot police. None of the well-known commanders of Iranian proxy militias were in sight.
Qais al-Khazali, a U.S.-san
Many Iranian proxies in Iraq have not mobilized due to weakened networks, shifting alliances, and leaders prioritizing personal interests over direct conflict.
Years of targeted assassinations, loss of supply lines, and commanders' transitions into politics and business have diminished their military potency.
Some groups have claimed attacks using drones in Iraq and the region, but these have caused little or no significant damage.
A more significant U.S.-Israeli attack, threats to Shi'ite communities, or direct Kurdish attacks on Iran could prompt larger mobilizations.
Many now seek personal benefits such as avoiding sanctions, accessing Western services, and maintaining political and economic positions.
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